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Abstract 
Recent models of altruism point out the success of a strategy called ‘Raise-The-
Stakes’ (RTS) in situations allowing variability in cooperation. In theory, RTS is 
difficult to exploit because it begins with a small investment in an iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game. When its cooperation is reciprocated, RTS increases its generosity, 
thereby taking advantage of cooperative opportunities. Previous research has shown 
that human subjects indeed adopt RTS but start out moderately cooperative rather 
than with a minimal investment. This raises the question how robust RTS is against 
exploitation, certainly in a noisy situation. In a behavioral experiment we investigate 
whether human subjects vary their cooperation in interaction with reciprocators and 
cheaters in an iterated non-discrete version of a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. When 
confronted with a strategy that matches the investment of the subject on the previous 
round, we find that subjects are likely to increase cooperation. However, cooperation 
gradually breaks down in interaction with a strategy that undercuts the level of 
cooperation of the subjects, indicating the robustness of RTS. In line with RTS 
modeling studies, but in contrast with the cheater detection literature, we find that 
human subjects are less willing to increase cooperation when the perceived 
likelihood of mistakes increases. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The evolutionary origin of cooperative behavior is an enduring puzzle. For several 
decades, various disciplines have tried to answer the question why an organism 
performs an act that is costly to itself and beneficial to another (e.g., Axelrod & Dion, 
1988; Axelrod, 1984; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd & Fehr, 2003; Hamilton, 1964a, 1964b; 
Trivers, 1971). The ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma Game’ (PDG) is the prevailing and orthodox 
framework for studying the evolution of cooperation, but it suffers from a procedural 
flaw when compared to the real-life situations it is designed to model. In a standard 
PDG players face a binary choice: whether to cooperate or to defect. Cooperation is 
however seldom an ‘all-or-nothing’ case (Killingback, Doebeli & Knowlton, 1999; 
Frean, 1996). Individuals can decide about the extent of their cooperation. Bats may 
vary cooperativeness in terms of the quantity of a meal shared (Wilkinson, 1984), 
impala may vary grooming time (Hart & Hart, 1992) and fish may vary cooperation 
by increasing or decreasing the inspection distance of a predator (Milinski, Lüthi, 
Eggler, & Parker, 1997). In line with Roberts and Renwick (2003), we explore in this 
study how human subjects gradually adapt the level of their cooperativeness 
throughout a series of interactions. We specifically investigate whether the strategy 
pursued by the opponent (subtle cheating vs. no-cheating) affects cooperation and 
how this is moderated by communication noise. 
 
If interactions with variable investment levels are considered, a new kind of cheating 
is possible because some cooperators may be less generous than others (Sherratt & 
Roberts, 1998). Rather than a plain defection (in the dichotomous iterated PDG), 
individuals may invest a little less than their partners (in an iterated PDG that allows 
variable investment). In principle, this ‘subtle cheating’ could gradually erode 
cooperation. Cosmides and Tooby argued that for cheating not to have prevented 
cooperation from emerging, humans must have evolved domain-specific cognitive 
capacities that allow them to detect cheaters (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 
1992). Natural selection should favor the ability to detect and discriminate against 
subtle cheaters (Trivers, 1971). There is even some evidence that cheaters may look   4
different from cooperators (Yamagishi, Tanida, Mashima, Shimoma & Kanazawa, 
2003). The capacity to distinguish defectors and cooperators allows humans to select 
partners that will reciprocate.  
 
How do evolutionary strategies (and hence human cooperativeness) survive the 
potentially destabilising effects of this type of subtle exploitation? Roberts and 
Sherratt (1998) simulated interactions between a number of simple strategies 
(amongst which cheater strategies) and found that cooperation emerged. It did so 
through a strategy of ‘Raise-The-Stakes’ (RTS). RTS invests a minimal amount (=a) at 
first (‘testing-the-water’) and then increases the investment with a certain amount 
(=b), if and only if the partner matches or betters RTS’ investment. RTS allows 
individuals to take advantage of cooperative opportunities while minimizing the risk 
of being exploited. Compare this strategy to the Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy that 
typically outperforms other strategies in the standard dichotomous PDG (Axelrod, 
1984). TFT is less cautious on its initial move by starting with a cooperative choice. A 
nicely starting strategy, such as TFT, makes a giant ‘leap of faith’ on the first move 
and is vulnerable to exploitation by cheaters in a PDG with variable investment.  
 
Roberts and Renwick (2003) tested whether the RTS strategy is adopted by human 
subjects in an iterated PDG with variable investment. The experiment supported 
Roberts and Sherratt’s prediction (1998) that investment in cooperation increases 
over the course of an interaction. Subjects increased donations over successive 
rounds when the partner reciprocated the investment. On the first move, however, 
subjects donated a considerably greater amount than the minimal amount required 
to ‘test the water’. This aspect of human behavior differed from the simulations but 
has an interesting implication. According to Robert and Sherratt’s (1998) simulations, 
RTS’ major advantage over TFT was its low initial cooperativeness, which 
immunizes the RTS strategy against exploitation. Therefore, an important question is 
whether the ‘faithful’ RTS strategy adopted by human subjects is robust against 
subtle cheating. The question what would happen when they are confronted with a 
cheater is legitimate, since natural populations are likely to contain a number of   5
individuals that do not cooperate (Doebeli, Hauert & Killingback, 2004; Sherratt & 
Roberts, 2001). Starting at an intermediate level makes the ‘faithful’ RTS-like strategy 
vulnerable to exploitation. There has been no direct experimental test of whether the 
faithful RTS-like strategy adopted by the subjects (Roberts & Renwick, 2003) is robust 
against ‘subtle cheating’.  
 
Humans following a ‘faithful’ RTS strategy have three options when subtly cheated 
on. They can either ignore the cheating and maintain their cooperation level without 
raising the stakes; they can harshly punish by investing nothing on the subsequent 
round; or they can switch to TFT and match the partner’s moves. Maintaining 
cooperation levels intermediate leads to a large relative fitness disadvantage because 
of an infinitely enduring exploitation by the subtle cheater. Turning to non-
cooperation in reaction to a subtle defection has relatively high opportunity costs. 
Theory predicts that a partner’s low investment is punished by matching the 
partner’s choice (Killingback & Doebeli, 2002; Roberts & Sherratt, 1998; Sherratt & 
Roberts, 2002). Playing TFT signals that the cheating is noted, but that the opponent 
gets another chance and at the same time, opportunity costs for the actor are reduced 
to a minimum. We therefore expect human subjects to pursue a TFT-like strategy 
whenever confronted with a cheater, but an RTS-strategy whenever confronted with 
a reciprocator. 
 
The robustness of RTS is not only determined by the strategy pursued by the 
opponent, but also by situational and contextual variables. Errors are likely to occur 
in reality and a single mistake can be calamitous for reciprocal altruism (e.g. Van 
Lange, Ouwerkerk & Tazelaar, 2002). The escalation of retaliation among Tit-For-Tat 
players after an occasional mistake gradually breaks down cooperation. A good way 
to cope with noise is allowing some percentage of the other player’s defections to go 
unpunished (Nowak & Sigmund, 1992, 1993; Wu & Axelrod, 1995). Generosity might 
prevent a single error from eliciting a sequence of defections. Barrett (1999) and 
Cosmides and Tooby (2004) predict that people would be tolerant towards an 
nonintentional act of defection and make a distinction between an inadvertent   6
mistake and intentional cheating. The interaction with a cheater strategy in a 
situation in which the perceived likelihood of mistakes is higher, could therefore 
result in higher levels of cooperation, compared to a game in which noise is absent. 
Evolutionary simulations (Sherratt & Roberts, 1999) however, have demonstrated 
that RTS-like strategies tend to become less generous as the probability of mistakes 
increases. To disentangle the two different hypotheses we explore the effect of noise 
on RTS strategies adopted by human subjects. Based on modeling studies (Sherratt & 
Roberts, 1999) we could predict that subjects would be less willing to raise stakes in 
noisy situations (both against subtle cheaters and non-cheaters). Based on the cheater 
detection literature, we could expect human subjects to display more generosity 
towards subtle cheaters as the perceived likelihood of inadvertent mistakes rises. 
 
2. Material & Methods 
 
  2.1 Participants 
Students (N=57) from the University of Leuven were recruited via the internet and 
participated in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with variable investment 
(adopted from Roberts & Renwick, 2003 and Van Lange et al., 2002). Five to eight 
subjects attended each research session. The subjects were seated in one of 8 partially 
enclosed cubicles, which prevented them from communicating with each other. They 
participated in return for a participation fee that varied with their payoff in the 
experimental game (between €6 and €8.5).  
 
  2.2 Procedure 
The instructions for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game that allows for variable 
investment were given in the cubicle by a computer program written in Macromedia 
Authorware®. The task was conducted on PC. In each round of the game, subjects 
were allocated €10, which they could either keep to themselves or donate to the other 
player in units of €1 (ranging from 0 to 10 coins). Each €1 kept was added to the 
subject’s account. Each €1 donated was doubled by the experimenter and added to 
the partner’s account. The possible outcomes of the game were presented in an 11 by   7
11 matrix that could be consulted throughout the experimental task. Subjects were 
informed about the partner’s decisions prior to making a subsequent choice. Subjects 
knew that the total amount of coins gathered throughout the PDG was used to 
calculate the participation fee. This made sure that decisions made in the PDG were 
involving. After explaining the game, the subjects acquainted with the choice 
procedure by 5 iterations of the task. These 5 test iterations made it clear to subjects 
that choices were made simultaneously. The subject was informed that her PC would 
be connected with another PC on a random basis and that choices were made 
anonymously. The subjects were unaware of the number of iterations of the game 
would be played.  
 
2.3 Dependent Variable 
In order to investigate the prediction of Roberts and Sherratt (1998) that investment 
in cooperation increases over the course of an interaction, a ‘Raising-The-Stakes’ 
coefficient was computed for each subject, by correlating round number with the 
number of coins the subject gave to the co-player. When subjects did not vary 
cooperation (n=10) and thus a correlation coefficient could not be computed, an RTS-
coefficient = 0 was assigned. Since the sampling distribution of Pearson's r is not 
normally distributed, a Fisher z' transformation was employed to convert RTS 




In the noise condition, the computer ‘checked’ whether the network connection 
between the cubicles was stable: the subjects were informed by a pop-up window 
before the start of the iterated PDG, that choices would not always be correctly sent 
to the other cubicle (“due to a problem with the computer server”). The computers 
used were outdated and made this warning believable. The computer automatically 
checked the “server reliability” and informed the subjects before the interaction in 
the PDG that mistakes could occur. The interaction between the two players was 
briefly interrupted once after round 6 by another pop-up window. Interaction in the   8
PDG continued as soon as the subject clicked a button on the pop-up window. None 
of the player’s choices were actually changed. In the ‘no noise’ condition, the 
interaction was never interrupted and the interaction in the PDG was not preceded 
by a ‘warning about mistakes’. 
2.4.2 Strategy 
The subjects played, unbeknownst to them, against a pre-programmed computer 
strategy. This procedure allows us to record the variability in cooperation with a 
minimal amount of interference. Consistent with the conceptual definition of ‘Tit-
For-Tat’ (TFT), TFT was programmed to begin by giving 6 coins to the subject, a nice 
and cooperative choice (Van Lange et al., 2002). In subsequent rounds, TFT was 
programmed to give exactly the same number of coins that the subject had given in 
the previous interaction round. The ‘Tit-For-Tat-Minus-1’ (TFT-1) strategy started by 
giving 6 coins on the first round and was programmed to subtract 1 coin from the 
subject’s previous choice in the subsequent round.  
 
  2.5 Design 
A within subjects design (each individual is subjected to each condition in a random 
order) was employed with Strategy and Noise as two independent within subject 
variables. At the end of the first condition, a filler task was given to the subjects and 
as soon as all subjects had finished the first interaction phase, they changed places 
and interacted in a second PDG with a different opponent. This procedure was 




A 2 (strategy) by 2 (noise) within subjects analysis of variance, revealed a main effect 
for strategy, F(1,168)=180.79,  p<.01. The positive correlation (M=0.57, Fisher 
transformed Pearson’s correlation coefficient) between round number and level of 
cooperation among subjects interacting with the TFT strategy, indicates that subjects 
increased cooperation against a strategy that matched the player’s investment. The 
interaction with a TFT-1 strategy yielded negative correlations (M=-0.71) between   9
round number and level of cooperation, which indicates that subjects decreased 
cooperation over the course of an interaction with a strategy that undercuts the 
player’s level of investment. The analysis also revealed a significant main effect of 
noise, F(1,168)=4.78, p<.05. When in a noisy situation subjects were less likely to raise 
stakes (M=-0.17) than when noise was absent (M=0.03). Subjects became less 
generous as the perceived probability of mistakes increased. The strategy by noise 
interaction did not yield a significant effect, F(1,168)=0.16, ns. Figure 1 shows the 
median cooperation level across the ten trials for the four conditions. Figure 2 shows 
the average correlations between round number and cooperation in the four 
conditions.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
The analysis yielded an R-square of 0.61. The RTS coefficient was positive in both 
TFT conditions, irrespective of noise, indicating that subjects raised their level of 
cooperation throughout the interaction, whenever the partner matched their choices. 
In the noise condition (M=0.45), Fisher transformed RTS coefficients differed 
significantly from zero, t(56)=4.15, p<.01, 95% confidence interval: [0.23;0.67]. In the 
no noise condition (M=0.70), Fisher transformed RTS coefficients differed 
significantly from zero, t(56)=6.15,  p<.01, 95% confidence interval: [0.47;0.93]. The 
RTS coefficient was negative in both TFT-1 conditions, irrespective of noise, 
indicating a decrease in cooperation over the course of the interaction when the 
partner undercuts the investment. In the noise condition (M=-0.81), Fisher 
transformed RTS coefficients differed significantly from zero, t(56)=-10.45, p<.01, 95% 
confidence interval: [-0.96; -0.65]. In the no noise condition (M=-0.63), Fisher 
transformed RTS coefficients differed significantly from zero, t(56)=-6.59, p<.01, 95% 
confidence interval: [-0.82; -0.47]. 
 
 
   10
4. Discussion 
 
In line with Roberts and Renwick’s findings (2003), we found that cooperation 
increased throughout the interaction when investments of the subject were matched. 
Subjects raised stakes when they played against a pre-programmed computer 
strategy that gave exactly the same number of coins that the subject gave in the 
previous interaction round (i.e. Tit-for-Tat).  
 
While previous research has shown that RTS is capable of taking advantage of 
cooperative opportunities, RTS’ reaction on defectors is fairly understudied. This 
question is relevant because humans seem to adopt a ‘faithful’ RTS strategy: They 
start at an intermediate level which makes them vulnerable to exploitation. 
Populations are likely to contain a class of individuals that temporarily or 
permanently lack the time, energy, resources, ability, or willingness to cooperate 
(Sherratt & Roberts, 2001). Theory predicts that low investments of the partner are 
punished by matching the partner’s level of cooperation (Sherratt & Roberts, 2002). 
The adaptation of RTS in a ‘Tit-for-Tat’ like strategy when human subjects interact 
with a ‘subtle cheater’ has, to our knowledge, not been researched yet. We found that 
cooperation decreased gradually throughout the interaction whenever the partner 
undercuts the cooperation of the subject. Rather than investing zero or maintaining 
an intermediate level of cooperation when confronted with a cheater, subjects 
adjusted their level of cooperation gradually downwards. This shift in strategy 
suggests that subjects discriminate cheaters and reciprocators, as has been put 
forward by Cosmides and Tooby (1992) and Trivers (1971).  
 
In our experiment we simulated network problems with the computers on which the 
experimental task was completed. Modeling studies (Sherratt & Roberts, 1999) 
suggest that individuals become less generous as the probability of mistakes 
increases. Cheater detection theory, in contrast, suggests that noise would reduce the 
negative effects of subtle cheating strategies. In this way, humans would suffer less 
opportunity costs. Our data are in line with the first prediction. As subjects perceived   11
a greater likelihood of mistakes, they were less willing to raise stakes against a 
reciprocator and less willing to give a cheater a new chance. In line with Sherratt & 
Roberts (1999), we interpret the non-cooperative behavior in noisy situations as 
subjects being more cautious when the perceived probability of errors rises. It seems 
as if the potential exploitation costs outweigh the opportunity costs in noisy 
situations.  
 
In contrast with Roberts and Sherratt’s initial simulations (1998) but consistent with 
Robert and Renwick’s (2003), the initial move in the PDG is substantially higher than 
the minimal amount needed to ‘test-the-water’. RTS-like strategies forego and delay 
potential gains by only investing a small amount on the first move, whereas TFT-like 
strategies are vulnerable to exploitation by starting out with a cooperative move. The 
potential cost of an initial cooperative move is underestimated in a standard PDG but 
could be quite substantial is a non-discrete PDG. A strategy cancelling out the 
opportunity cost carried by RTS strategies and minimizing the risk of exploitation 
carried by TFT strategies, should start out with a moderately cooperative move. 
Initial moves of human subjects could be the result of the combination of concerns 
about losing gains (i.e. opportunity costs) and exploitation and this could explain the 
moderately high levels of cooperation on the first round. A strategy that is informed 
about probabilities of meeting a cheater versus a reciprocator and adapt its initial 
move to these probabilities might be more successful than low starting RTS or high 
starting TFT strategies. 
 
We extend previous findings by examining ‘Raise-the-Stakes’ in a situation where 
subjects make simultaneous offers, as opposed to a game where offers are made 
sequentially (e.g. Roberts & Renwick, 2003). It has been shown that outcomes for the 
alternating PDG can be quite different from the simultaneous case (e.g. Frean, 1994; 
Nowak & Sigmund, 1994; Wedekind & Milinski, 1996). The replication of the 
findings of Roberts & Renwick (2003) suggests the viability of RTS in both the 
alternating and simultaneous situations. As noted by Wedekind & Milinski (1996), 
both the simultaneous and the alternating cases could have been part of human   12
ecology. In contrast with Roberts & Renwick (2003) we did not find ceiling effects in 
cooperation towards the end of the interaction. This could be due to the fact that the 
orientation to long term consequences by successive turn taking reduces 
competitiveness. In a sequential game the participant might think ahead and be 
planful regarding the maximization of long-term outcomes (Insko et al., 1998). 
Hence, the sequential game could increase the level of cooperation at a faster rate, 
because of the anticipation of the partner’s subsequent choice.  
 
We found that human subjects add a small amount (=b) to their level of cooperation 
when investments were reciprocated and that subjects punish lower investments by 
matching the partner’s move. Theory predicts that if the partner’s cooperative 
investment exceeds RTS’ level of cooperation, RTS should respond by adding an 
even bigger amount (=2b) to its own previous investment (Sherratt & Roberts, 2002). 
Future research could investigate whether human subjects double their stakes when 
they interact with RTS, creating an even more rapid upward spiral of increasing 
cooperation. Some cooperators however may be less generous than others (Sherratt 
& Roberts, 1998) and subjects might differ in their willingness to raise stakes: 
personality variables, such as Social Value Orientation (e.g. Van Lange, 1999), could 
explain inter-individual differences in the b-parameter that characterizes RTS. 
Additionally, future research could investigate whether other situational factors 
might affect the adoption of RTS by humans. Subjects knowing that their choices in a 
PDG will be made public at the end of the game might act more generously than 
subjects whose choices are made anonymously. Subjects may perceive that being 
cooperative would enhance one’s reputation (e.g. Barclay, 2004; Nowak & Sigmund, 
1998). The possibility of indirect reciprocity might boost RTS. Finally, future research 
could explore why situational noise does not buffer the negative effects as cheater 
detection theory suggests. Possibly, noise buffers a decrease in cooperation only 
when it is even more subtle (cheating occasionally rather than defecting all the time)?  
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